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Abstract—We design and evaluate a traffic anonymization
protocol for wireless networks, aiming to protect against com-
putationally powerful adversaries. Our protocol builds on recent
key-generation techniques, that leverage intrinsic properties of
the wireless together with standard coding techniques. We show
how to exploit the security properties of such keys to design a Tor-
like anonymity network, without making any assumptions about
the computational capabilities of an adversary. Our analysis and
evaluation on simulated ad-hoc wireless networks, shows that our
protocol achieves a level of anonymity comparable to the level
of the Tor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a significantly large fraction of our personal and sen-
sitive data is carried out on wireless systems, encryption and
anonymity are in many cases essential. The Tor anonymity
network [1] is an overlay network that combines Onion
Routing with a light-weight system design for Internet traffic
anonymization, and it is rapidly becoming the prevalent ap-
proach to anonymity today. In the core of its design, basic
cryptographic primitives are used, e.g., the Diffie-Hellman
key-agreement, RSA and AES encryption. The security of
such cryptographic schemes relies on computational-hardness
assumptions: an adversary cannot breach security in useful
time, since she does not possess the necessary computational
power. We ask the question: can we design an alternative, Tor-
like communication scheme for wireless networks, that offers
a level of anonymity comparable to the level of anonymity that
Tor does, without assuming anything about the computational
and memory capabilities of an adversary?
Recent work has shown that, by exploiting inherent wireless
network properties, such as channel variability and noise,
along with standard network coding techniques, we can fast
and reliably create keys among network nodes, where the secu-
rity of the keys does not rely on the computational limitations
of an adversary. Algorithms that create such unconditionally
secure keys were studied theoretically in [2] and translated into
practical protocols for 1-hop networks in [3], and for multi-hop
networks in [4]. We briefly summarize this work and, building
on it, we show how we can, using the created keys and their
properties, design a Tor-like anonymization network.
Similarly to the Tor anonymity approach, our goal is to
enable nodes connect to the Internet, while hiding their iden-
tity within a set of potential users. Tor achieves anonymity
by bouncing encrypted communications around a distributed
network of relays; we similarly bounce encrypted communi-
cations among the wireless network nodes. In our use-case
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scenario, an information packet travels from the source node
along a randomly selected path towards a final hop to the
Internet. We use layered, one-time pad encryption to both
secure the messages against eavesdropping, and ensure that
each relay along the path is aware of only a fraction of the
entire communication path, in a fashion similar to Tor.
As a use-case, consider a street protest, where participants
use local communication (e.g. WiFi) to cooperate and hide the
identity of someone who needs to use cellular Internet connec-
tivity to send reports to the media (and thus might be a target
for the authorities eavesdropping the local communication).
In addition to eavesdropping, the authorities might interrogate
a participant and force him to reveal his knowledge on the
on-going communications. While Tor preserves anonymity as
long as the cryptographic primitives used remain unbreakable,
we aim, with our approach, to ensure anonymity even if the
adversary has unlimited computational power.
The main contribution of this paper is in the design of
a traffic anonymization protocol, that exploits the security
properties of the keys produced using the technique in [4].
Our privacy analysis demonstrates that we can achieve a Tor-
like level of anonymity and our experimental evaluation shows
that we can achieve almost perfect anonymity within a group
of approximately half the network size. We note that we do
not advocate our protocol to substitute Tor and the existing
cryptographic primitive used; however, as the bulk of our data
is increasingly carried through wireless, and becomes vulnera-
ble to new computational attacks, we believe scientists should
explore new techniques to complement existing practices.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present our
setup and some background material in Section II. Next,
we present our traffic anonymization scheme and its privacy
analysis in Section III, and we experimentally evaluate its
performance in Section IV. Section V summarizes related
work and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SETUP AND BACKGROUND
A. System and Adversary Model
We consider a network of n wireless nodes that form a k-
hop ad-hoc network, where k refers to the maximum distance
(in hops) between any two nodes. From the nature of wireless,
each node’s transmission can potentially be received by its
neighbors, i.e., all nodes within its transmission radius. We
assume that every node has a unique identifier that is revealed
to all other nodes in the network. We also assume that every
node is an honest-but-curious node: it legitimately participates
in the protocols used, but tries to breach security using the
information at its disposal.
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In the network there exists also a passive adversary, Eve,
who eavesdrops but does not reveal her presence with any
form of communication, and can be located anywhere inside
the network, at an unknown location. We assume that Eve has
access to the same physical layer (radio technology, number of
antennas etc.) as the legitimate nodes, and is not omni-present
in the network. However, we assume that Eve may have infinite
memory as well as unbounded computational capabilities at
her disposal; this would follow the model of an adversary
that does not want to reveal her identity by using specialized
equipment, yet has offline access to unbounded resources to
breach security. In the following we will call the adversary
Eve, without specifying (unless needed) if she is a passive
eavesdropper or an honest-but-curious node.
B. The Basic Tor Operations
We here summarize the basic Tor [1] operations, without
describing in full detail the whole system architecture; we
rather focus on the key agreement procedure and the use of
the keys for anonymous communication.
A node S wants to send a message m to a public destination
D (e.g. a web-server) using the Tor anonymization network,
i.e., a set of collaborating nodes, the so-called Onion Routers
(OR), that will relay m toward its final destination. In a first
phase, S negotiates a symmetric key with each relay. Assume
S selects two nodes (the minimum required, assuming S is an
OR as well) R1, R2, as shown in Fig. 1, and agrees on two
symmetric keys with each one of them:
1) S sends to R1 the first half of the Diffie-Hellman handshake
gx1 , encrypted with the public key K+R1 of R1. R1 responds
back with the other half of the handshake gy1 , and a hash of
the negotiated key (with F (·) denoting a secure hash function).
S and R1 compute the key KSR1 = g
x1y1 .
2) S sends to R1 the packet KSR1{R2,K+R2{gx
2}}, that is a
request to negotiate a symmetric key with R2, encrypted with
the key KSR1 (128-AES encryption). R1 and R2 perform the
same actions as S and R1 respectively in step 1.
In a second phase, S communicates a message m to D by
sending the packet KSR1{R2,KSR2{D,m}} to R1, which
extracts the first layer of encryption and forwards the inner
packet KSR2{D,m} to R2; finally, R2 extracts the second
layer of encryption and sends m to D.
We note two fundamental properties of the Tor design:
• Property 1: R1 cannot compute the key KSR2 , since gx2
is protected with the public key of R2. It cannot, namely,
decrypt the packet KSR2{D,m} and reveal the message m
and its final destination D.
• Property 2: R2 does not know if it is setting up a symmetric
key with R1 or any other node in the network (in our example,
node S). In other words, it does not know which is the
originator of the packet KSR2{D,m}; from R2’s perspective
the originator could be R1, S or any other network node with
equal probability.
These two properties ensure the basic premise of Tor: a
relay knows only two nodes along the communication path, its
predecessor and its successor, but cannot ultimately link S to
S R1 R2 DK+R1{gx1}
gy1 , F (KSR1)
KSR1{R2,K+R2{gx2}} K+R2{gx2}
gy2 , F (KSR2)KSR1{gy2 , F (KSR2)}
KSR1{R2,KSR2{D,m}} KSR2{D,m} m
Figure 1. Tor anonymization protocol – example
D and m. Anonymous communication is, therefore, preserved
under the presence an adversary Eve, who in this case has
bounded computational power and cannot breach the security
of the cryptographic primitives used.
C. Key Construction Based on Erasures
A basic building block of our anonymization protocol is
the key-agreement procedure. Due to the inherent channel
variability and noise in the wireless, Eve is prone to packet
erasures, enabling, thus, the legitimate nodes to use their
shared, correctly received packets (unknown to Eve) as a
source of secrecy. The idea of linearly combining shared
packets for constructing information-theoretically secure keys,
has been presented in [2]. As an example, suppose that two
nodes, Alice and Bob, share three random packets, i.e., packets
with randomly produced payload bits, X1, X2 and X3, and
assume they also know that there is at least one packet out
of these three that Eve does not have. Then they can both
compute K = X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ X3, which serves as a pairwise
key, certainly secure from Eve. Note that Alice and Bob do
not need to know which packets Eve has, they only need to
know how many she has. In general, using Maximum Distance
Separable (MDS) codes, we can securely create as many linear
combinations as the number of packets Eve does not have [2].
We built on this idea to propose a concrete secret-key
agreement protocol in [3], and we were able to produce
secure keys at a rate of Kbps, in an 1-hop test-bed. We
further extended our protocols for multi-hop networks in [4],
where the existence of interference and multi-path provides
additional sources of packet erasures, and we simulated the
key-agreement in multi-hop setups up to 5 hops and 500
nodes. The observed high secrecy rates (at the order of Kbps)
suggested the feasibility of using the produced keys as one-
time pad encryption keys.
The anonymization protocol presented in this paper is not,
however, bounded to this specific key-generation technique.
Any key-agreement procedure, that enables nodes in a multi-
hop wireless network to establish secure pairwise and group
keys, under the presence of Eve, would serve as the base of
our traffic anonymization protocol.
D. Goals and Performance Metrics
The goal of our traffic anonymization protocol is to create
uncertainty to Eve about the sender and the receiver of a
given message m. Let S,D denote the random variables that
describes who the actual sender and receiver is, and E Eve’s
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knowledge on the protocol and the produced traffic.
• The sender uncertainty US and destination uncertainty UD
are measured as the conditional entropies:
US = H(S|E) and UD = H(D|E).
• The sender-receiver uncertainty expresses the uncertainty
about the communication pair and equals
US−D = H(S|E) +H(D|E).
US−D gives the entropy of the joint distribution of (S,D)
in case the two random variables are independent from Eve’s
perspective. The maximum source uncertainty within a group
would be achieved if Eve believes each group member to be
the source with equal probability.
III. TRAFFIC ANONYMIZATION
We here describe a communication scheme aiming to
provide a level of anonymity that is comparable with the
anonymity level of the Tor system [1], albeit also secure
against computationally unbounded, but presence-limited, ad-
versaries. The design of our protocol aims in satisfying the
two fundamental Properties 1 and 2 of Tor, that we described
in Section II-B.
A. Main Ideas and Examples
The steps of negotiating the symmetric keys in Tor, are
essentially replaced by the key-generation protocol in [4]: In
an initial step, legitimate nodes produce and transmit random
packets; next, they publicly announce to each other which
packets they correctly received. In a second step, the nodes
linearly combine their common packets to create keys, on
request. We now describe how they can use these resources
for anonymous communication, as depicted in Fig. 2.
Example: S wants to communicate message m to D:
1) S randomly selects two relay nodes R1 and R2.
2) S uses one-time pad encryption to send to R1 the message
m and the identities D and R2 through the packet:
KSR1{R2,KG2{D,m}} = KSR1 ⊕ {R2,KG2 ⊕ {D,m}},
where KSR1 is a secure pairwise key between S and R1 (we
will call this link encryption), and KG2 is a random packet
that all nodes in a group G2 have successfully received, with
{S,R2} ⊂ G2 but R1 /∈ G2, i.e., this packet is secret from
R1 (we will call this group encryption).
3) R1, that has the pairwise key KSR1 , removes it to find out
that it needs to forward to R2; it then re-encrypts using the
pairwise key KR1R2 and sends the packet:
KR1R2{KG2{D,m}} = KR1R2 ⊕KG2 ⊕ {D,m}.
R1 does not possess KG2 and thus does not learn D and m.
4) R2 removes both KR1R2 and KG2 , and sends m to D; R2
does not know that S originated message m.
The link and the group keys serve complimentary roles in
ensuring anonymity. The role of the link keys, KSR1 and
KR1R2 , is to hide R2, D, and m from intermediate relays
S R1 R2 D
KSR1{R2,KG2{D,m}}
KR1R2{KG2{D,m}}
m
Figure 2. Traffic anonymization protocol – example
as well as external eavesdroppers, similarly to the symmetric
encryption in Tor. The role of the group key KG2 is threefold.
First, it hides the identity of the destination from R1, who
only learns the identity of the next relay R2. Second, because
it also hides the message m from R1, even if R1 overhears
the unencrypted message m that R2 transmits, it cannot link
m to packet KG2{D,m} and thus again will not learn the
destination. Third, it hides the identity of the sender within
the group G2 for R2, who only knows that S ∈ G2. In other
words, the role of the group keys is to provide the basic
anonymity property: each relay knows only its predecessor
and its successor in the communication path; similarly to Tor.
How we have created keys has significant implications
on the anonymity protocol we have designed. Our protocol
essentially combines the layered (onion) encryption of Tor
with one-time pad encryption. We can afford to use one-time
encryption, exploiting the high key-generation rates in [4]; S
can randomly select R1 and R2 because we can create keys
between all pairs of nodes; and because we distribute random
packets to create shared randomness, we can easily find large
sets G2 that share common random packets (see Section IV).
The size of G2 is important as it determines the amount of
anonymity: the larger it is, the harder it is for the adversary
to guess correctly the originator of a packet.
B. Traffic Anonymization Protocol
The protocol we described in the previous example naturally
extends to multiple relays, as described next.
1) S selects randomly t relays R1, . . . , Rt.
2) S creates each group key KGi by randomly selecting a
packet from the packet dissemination phase among the
ones that (a) are not known by Ri−1, (b) are known by
Ri, (c) are known by at least σ other nodes, where the
parameter σ defines the minimum size of Gi.
3) S sends to R1 a packet of the form:
KSR1{R2,KG2{R3,KG3{. . .KGt{D,m}}}}
such that {S,Ri} ⊂ Gi, Ri−1 /∈ Gi.
4) The first relay R1 decrypts the packet using the link key
KSR1 and encrypts the encapsulated packet destined for
R2, using the link key KR1R2 , and sends the packet:
KR1R2{KG2{R3,KG3{. . .KGt{D,m}}}}}.
5) The relay Ri sends to Ri+1 the packet:
KRiRi+1{KGi+1{Ri+2,KGi+2{. . .KGt{D,m}}}}},
which is produced as follows: 1) After removing the
two outermost encryption layers (first with a link key
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KRi−1Ri and then with a group key KGi ), the received
packet reveals the next relay Ri+1 on the path and an
encapsulated packet that is encrypted with KGi+1 . 2) Ri
encrypts the encapsulated packet with KRi,Ri+1 .
6) The last relay Rt simply forwards m to D, after removing
the two remaining encryption layers.
Note that this protocol can be used to also support two-way
communication: since every relay knows the preceding relay
along a path, they can forward a response from D by applying
the same type of encryptions but now in the reverse direction.
C. Privacy Analysis
We use the term flow to describe the set of all the packets
that are exchanged to support the communication of a specific
S-D pair. We are interested in four forms of unlinkability:
• Unlinkability of packets: Eve is not able to tell whether two
(or more) overheard packets belong to the same flow.
• Unlinkability with the destination: Eve is not able to tell
which is the destination of an overheard packet. We measure
this with the metric UD = H(D|E).
• Unlinkability with the source: Eve is not able to tell which
is the source of an overheard packet. We measure this with
the metric US = H(S|E).
• Source-Destination unlinkability: Eve does no learn which
source communicates with which destination.
Recall that for us Eve may be a passive external eavesdropper,
or an honest-but-curious node in our network.
1) Unlinkability of Packets: Clearly, we need to have more
than one flows in our network, as the uncertainty, to which
flow a packet belongs, is constrained by the number of flows.
We will next assume that a large number of flows share the
network; this is also a basic premise of Tor.
If Eve overhears a packet, she could learn which node
transmitted it and which node received it (she could learn
one link of the path); if she could overhear multiple packets
that she found were part of the same flow, she could piece
together parts of the path, and thus her uncertainty about the
communicating parties would reduce. Packet unlinkability is
essential to avoid giving such side information to Eve.
In our protocol, the link keys together with the group keys,
ensure that all transmitted packets are statistically independent
and thus, even if Eve observes multiple of them, she cannot
correlate them. The use of link keys ensure that packets appear
statistically independent of each other whether or not they
belong to the same flow. This property holds also against a
relay: the content of a packet a relay can see, by knowing its
own link key, is independent of the same packet encrypted
with a different link key. It means relays cannot recognize
packets that they themselves forwarded earlier along the path.
The only packet that is not protected with a link key is
the last packet of the flow. Hence, it remains to protect the
last message from a relay, who knows also a link key. The
group key plays a role here: it encrypts the message from
relays, which makes also the last packet independent and
thus unlinkable with its previously seen encrypted version.
It follows that for all nodes (including Eve) packets remain
unlinkable with each other in the network.
2) Unlinkability with the Destination: If Eve overhears the
transmission of Rt (of the last relay on the path), then she
learns the destination of the packet, and thus UD = 0; trivially,
this is the case if Eve is the node Rt. The leakage of this
information is unavoidable, since D is outside the network.
This is also the case in Tor.
If Eve overhears the transmission of any other packet, the
packet remains unlinkable with its destination. Indeed, link
keys protect the identity of the destination from any node who
is not a relay on the path; and group keys protect the identity
of the destination from the nodes that are relays. It follows
that for any node, including relays, the destination remains
unlinkable with any packet of the flow except for the last-hop
unencrypted packet.
3) Unlinkability with the Sender: We here need to distin-
guish cases depending on which node Eve is. First, assume
Eve is not one of the Ri relays on the path; then the link
keys make the different packets of a flow indistinguishable,
i.e., Eve cannot tell if an overheard packet is the first packet
of the flow, and cannot learn anything about the sender. Next,
assume Eve is R1. Then Eve knows that S is the source, and
thus for the first packet US = 0. This is also the case in Tor,
if the adversary manages to compromise the first onion-router,
to which the user’s onion-proxy connects.
Assume now Eve is a relay Ri on the path. Ri knows that
S ∈ Gi ∩Gi+1, since the source has to be a member of both
groups. Thus it can link S with the group Gi ∩Gi+1. In the
example of Fig. 2, R2 learns that S ∈ G2. Ideally, any node in
Gi∩Gi+1 would appear equally likely to be the actual source,
i.e., Eve would infer a uniform distribution over these nodes.
However, the selection of the groups Gi does not guarantee
this property; the distribution will be skewed from the uniform.
We numerically evaluate the uncertainty US in the evaluation
Section IV, and find that it is very close to uniform.
4) Sender-Receiver Unlinkability: From the previous argu-
ments it follows that the uncertainty about the communicating
pair US−D = US + UD is never 0. Moreover, US−D is the
largest possible when Eve is not one of the relays Ri and she
does not overhear the last packet of the flow. It is reasonable
to assume that the uncertainty about the destination H(D) is
larger than about the source H(S), since the destination could
be any server on the Internet. Thus US−D takes its smallest
value if Eve is the last relay Rt on the path. In our evaluation
we assume this worst-case situation and numerically evaluate
the sender-receiver uncertainty under this condition.
5) Side Information Attacks: When analyzing the unlinka-
bility properties that our protocol provides, we only considered
the information that the content of the transmitted packets
can reveal to an adversary. However, an adversary may also
observe additional side-information; the amount and type of
this information depends on the actual implementation of the
protocol and also on its interplay with other protocols (e.g.
the routing protocol used). Such side information is present
irrespective of the applied anonymizer solution; indeed most
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known attacks against Tor are of this kind (e.g. [5], [6]).
The possible sources of side information include traffic anal-
ysis (timing information, number of sent/received packets),
topology (routing and location information), and application
level analysis. For an overview of side-channel attacks we
refer to [7]. Although it is not possible to conceal all the
side information, by its design, our protocol offers a level of
anonymity comparable to that of Tor.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use the Java-based, discrete event-driven simulator JiST
[8] together with the SWANS library [9], for ad-hoc wire-
less networks. In Table I we summarize the configuration
parameters of the simulation setup. We use an IEEE 802.11b/g
compliant MAC configuration. We simulate a wireless ad-hoc
network as a set of n nodes uniformly at random placed on a
square area of dimension x meters. All nodes have the same
communication capabilities that yield a transmission range of
r meters. Under the configuration parameters in Table I, the
range is r ≈ 200m. Therefore, for a k-hop network we set
x = k ∗ r/√2. We define the unit area as an 1-hop area. We
consider networks with fixed network density per unit area,
that is, for a k-hop area and a given density d (nodes per unit
area) we have in total n = k2 ∗ d nodes. We first run the
key-agreement in [4] and then our anonymization protocol.
Fig. 3 numerically evaluates the sender-receiver unlinkabil-
ity that our protocol achieves. We assume that Eve is the worst-
case node for us relay Rt (as we explain in Section III-C);
in this case, the sender-receiver uncertainty equals the source
uncertainty US = H(S|E). We compare this to the ideal un-
certainty H(S) Eve would have, if each group member would
be the source with equal probability (note that H(S) = 5
amounts to uniform probability within a group of size 25). We
find that with our protocol we can restrict Eve to only learn
that the source belongs in a set of size approximately half the
network population; moreover, Eve perceives each node in the
group to be the source with probability close to uniform.
V. RELATED WORK
Our anonymity protocol combines the onion routing of
Tor [1] with one-time pad encryptions, to provide protection
against computationally unbounded adversaries. There also ex-
ist alternative anonymous routing protocols specially designed
for ad-hoc networks (e.g. [10], [11]) but they all build on
MAC Layer Slot Time 20µs
Wmin 31 slots
Wmax 1023 slots
SIFS 10µs
DIFS 50 µs
PHY header 192 bits
MAC header 272 bits
DATA frame header 464 bits
ACK frame 304 bits
PHY Layer Frequency 2.4 GHz
Basic Rate 1 Mbps
Data Rate 36 Mbps
Tx Power 15 dBm
Sensitivity Threshold -81 dBm
Reception Threshold -71 dBm
Reception Model SNR
SNR Threshold 15 dB
Channel Model Propagation Model TwoRay
Fading Model Rayleigh
Interference Model AdditiveNoise
Table I
CONFIGURATION OF SIMULATION SETUP
computational limitations. In this paper, we considered privacy
in the presence of a passive adversary; an active adversary
might for instance intentionally introduce timing patterns that
she can later identify [5]. Introducing latency and mixing [12]
can make timing attacks more difficult but at the same time
decreases throughput.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented the design and the analysis of an anonymiza-
tion protocol that leverages the key-generation in [4], in order
to offer a Tor-like level of anonymity, yet without relying
on the computational limitations of Eve. Our experimental
evaluation shows that, with our protocol, we can achieve
almost perfect anonymity within a group of roughly half the
network size.
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